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Abstract— Global threats, international terrorist groups and 
North Korea, paralyze political decisions by attacking and 
neutralizing the credibility of the main policy makers in the 
state and simultaneously manipulate the public opinion, which 
results in distrust and disconnection between each other. These 
threats use social media as their biggest core routine to conduct 
such attacks. This paper presents a series of processes and 
frameworks on how a commander should make a decision 
when performing a cyber psychological operation using social 
media. Based on the Endsley model, which is a situational 
awareness model, the paper compares the strengths and 
weaknesses of the three social media operations (IGMO, 
DeSMO, OSMO) performed by the military and proposes a 
guideline for performing an operation. 
 
Index Terms— Command&Control(C2); Cyber 
Psychological Warfare; Information Operation; Situational 




Global threats, international terrorist groups and North 
Korea, use various tools to strengthen their influence 
worldwide. Social Media, due to its convenience, are 
increasingly used by the global threats to accomplish their 
purposes and spread their message [1]. For example, Al-
Shabaab used Twitter during its attack on the Westgate 
Shopping Mall, and the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) uses social media when releasing 
threatening videos of beheadings. These attacks, also called 
as cyber psychological warfare, refer to the planned use of 
propaganda or any other instruments that affects the views, 
feelings, attitudes, and behaviors of the target country and 
group to achieve the attacker's policy goals in cyberspace. 
Specifically, cyber psychological warfare is getting more 
and more popular due to the anonymity of cyberspace, and 
the widespread ripple effects that overcome spatio - 
temporal constraints. International terrorist groups have 
shown cyber psychological warfare to propagate the brutal 
scenes of terrorist acts such as destruction of enemy 
facilities and suicide bombing and murder of prisoners, 
publicizing their activities and rallying support. They see 
their mission as not only simply creating terror among its 
foes, but also delivering their messages [2]. Recent cyber 
psychological attacks have been accelerated by the rapid 
spread of SNS (Social Networking Service) such as Twitter, 
Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. SNS has become a very 
effective means of multimedia communication that transmits 
news at the speed of light. It enables distribution of almost 
real-time information to a wide variety of unspecified 
persons as well as SNS users. Due to these strengths, 90 
percent of terrorism on the Internet takes place using social 
networking service [3]. As the social media power and 
efficacy proved, the military begins to study whether it 
could be used as a tool of cyber psychological warfare. 
In a study by Clay Shirky from the New York University, 
Shirky said discussion of the political impact of social media 
has focused on the power of mass protests to topple 
governments [4]. Furthermore, in a study by Umong Sethi 
from the Indian Army, Sethi said that monitoring of the 
social media over time is a useful tool to gather information 
regarding various trends and undercurrents among the target 
audience to counter insurgency and terrorist situations [5]. 
According to these studies, social media operations can have 
value at the operational and tactical levels, and directly 
contribute to the effectiveness of Cyber Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (also called Cyber ISR) 
and Cyber Operational Preparation of the Environment 
(Cyber OPE). For example, by gathering direct content and 
metadata, the operator can get to the specific software and 
hardware configuration or physical location of the target [6]. 
Social media can also provide a useful attack platform as an 
alternative Command and Control (also called C2) [6]. 
Taking advantage of these strengths, social media can be a 
key means to hold dominant position during warfare. 
However, there is no process for cyber psychological 
warfare using social media directly. This paper presents a 
set of standards and frameworks for the military commander 
to decide what kind of social media operation (SMO) should 
be taken when conducting cyber psychological warfare. To 
illustrate this process, the paper used the Endsley Model, 





This section describes the background to the two most 
important concepts in this paper, the Endsley model and the 
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) methodology. 
The Endsley model serves as a main framework proposed in 
the paper, and the FAIR methodology is used to support the 
Endsley model. 
 
A. Endsley Model 
The three-step model of situational awareness was 
initially developed to understand air operations, but it could 
be extended to other areas such as power generation, 
petrochemicals, nuclear power, and command and control. 
Endsley's model describes the SA state and describes three 
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stages of SA formation: perception, comprehension, and 
projection[7]. As shown in Figure 1, the Endsley model is 




Figure 1: The Brief figure of Endsley’s Situational Awareness Model 
 
1) Level 1 SA: Perception of Data and the Elements the 
Environment 
This is the lowest level of situational awareness and it 
relates to the pilot's awareness of aircraft instrumentation, 
aircraft behavior, terrain, air traffic control, and other 
aircraft information in the sky. At this stage, no 
interpretation of the data is performed and only the initial 
receipt of information in its raw form is represented. If the 
data could be extracted at this stage, the operator will be 
able to see the status of the specific variable but will not be 
able to consolidate the data. 
 
2) Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the Meaning and 
Significance of the Situation 
If the data can be integrated and synthesized to understand 
the relevance of the pilot’s work, comprehension can be 
derived from the perception of the elements. The 
comprehension phase (e.g. the time and distance to the 
remaining fuel, the tactical status of the threats, the mission 
status, etc.) is necessary for the understanding of the 
importance of factors and their progress. In this way, the 
pilot can determine if there is an intended outcome in his 
action. Endsley argued that the level of achieved 
understanding represents the pilot's expertise. Individuals 
with less skilled can achieve a lower level 2 SA, despite 
achieving the same level 1 SA as a skilled opponent. 
 
3) Level 3 SA: Projection of Future States and Events 
This is the highest level of situational awareness and 
relates to the ability to predict the future of environmental 
elements (e.g. potential aircraft collision predictions). The 
accuracy of predictions depends largely on the accuracy of 
Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA. Projections of anticipated 
future situations give pilots sufficient time to resolve 
conflicts and develop action plans to achieve them. 
 
B. Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) 
FAIR is the standard quantitative model for information 
security and operational risk [8]. It is both a taxonomy of the 
information risk factors and a risk management framework 
[9]. Additionally, FAIR provides a method for measuring 
the factors that are related to an information risk. Figure 2 




Figure 2: Factoring Diagram of FAIR Model 
 
FAIR emphasizes the risk as an uncertain property, which 
should focus on how probable is a given event. Specifically, 
risk is comprised of the probable frequency and probable 
magnitude of future loss. In other words, it is about how 
frequently loss is likely to happen and how much loss is 
likely to result. 
To estimate the degree of the risk, FAIR model describes 
four stages. In each stage, several risk factors and concepts 
are included. 
The first stage of risk is identifying Scenario Components: 
the asset and the threat agents. According to the Introduction 
to Factor Analysis of Information Risk, the asset is defined 
as any data, device, or other component of the environment 
that supports information-related activities, which can be 
illicitly accessed, used, disclosed, altered, destroyed or 
stolen, resulting in a loss. Further, it is claimed that the 
threat is anything that can act against an asset in a manner 
that can result in harm. Drawn from this definition, this 
study specified the asset as military confidential documents 
and the threat agents as technical hackers, which is not an 
insider or a spy. 
The second stage is evaluating the Loss Event 
Frequency(LEF). LEF is the probable frequency, within a 
given time-frame, that the loss will materialize from a threat 
agent’s action. LEF is composed of two factors called the 
Threat Event Frequency(TEF) and the Vulnerability(Vuln). 
TEF, which is the probable frequency that threat agent will 
act in a manner that may result in a loss. It is comprised of 
the Contact Frequency(CF) and the Probability of 
Action(PoA). Furthermore, Vuln, which is the probability 
that a threat agent’s actions will result in a loss, is comprised 
of the Threat Capability(TCap) and the Difficulty(Diff). 
 
Table 1 
Table of Risk Generation 
 
 
The third stage is evaluating the Probable Loss Magnitude 
(PLM). PLM is the concept of loss that materializes directly 
as a result of the event. 
The final stage is deriving and articulating risk. Risk is 
simply derived from LEF and PLM, which are estimated in 
the previous stages. Table I is used for articulating risk 
qualitatively. “C” stands for “Critical”, “H”,”M” and “L” is 
“High”, “Medium”, “Low” respectively. Additionally, “SV: 
stands for “Severe”, “Sg” is “Significant”. 
SV H H C C C
H M H H C C
Sg M M H H C
M L M M H H
L L L M M M
VL L L M M M
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III. RELATED WORKS 
 
A. The Social Side of ‘Cyber Power’? Social Media and 
Cyber Operations [6]  
This paper categorized military social media operations 
into three types: information-gathering (IGMO), defensive 
social media operations (DeSMO), and offensive social 
media operations (OSMO). 
According to the paper, Information Gathering Media 
Operation(IGMO) focuses on passive information-gathering. 
It can be used for monitoring adversary activities and for 
targeting. Through IGMO, military and intelligence 
agencies monitor and document social media activities 
passively, rather than interacting with known social media 
actors. IGMO deals with two types of data: direct data 
collection and metadata. Direct data collection is the content 
displayed on social media, and the metadata reveals 
important details such as the location of target, the time that 
the target is active and many others. 
On the other hand, Defensive Social Media Operations 
(DeSMO) is more active than IGMO. DeSMO can be used 
as counter- messaging or counter-propaganda. DeSMO does 
not play a direct role in terms of cyber operations. However, 
it is recognized as a key component of the deradicalization 
campaign. 
Offensive Social Media Operation (OSMO) is more 
aggressive than the broadcasting or counter-narrative tool, 
which is the role of the existing SMO. Specifically, OSMO 
covers information gathering, information campaigning, 
providing accurate cyber effects, responding to the social 
media features of the opponent, degrading, denying or 
destroying. 
 
B. Data to Decisions for Cyberspace Operations [10]  
The paper describes the data driven decision-making 
functions needed to effectively perform cyber operations. 
According to the paper, in cyber operations, big-data 
collection is the key factor. Based on the collected data, 
there are three categories of decision-making: automatic, 
assisted and discovery. 
Automatic decisions are made by an automated system 
that analyzes data in real time for the purpose of responding 
to changes in the state of the network. It is determined by 
the data collected by the network sensor or device within a 
few seconds. (e.g. Intrusion Detection System, Firewall, et 
cetera) 
Assisted decisions determine the identification of 
cyberspace events, the threat vectors used, and the 
determination of the technical impact of the incident on 
support using analytical tools and decision support tools. 
Discovery Decisions is a decision to manually analyze 
larger amounts of data. There are activities such as 
determining the impact of a mission, the attributes of enemy 
action, and the identification of hostilities. 
Previous studies above analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of social media operation and the categories of 
data-based decision-making. Data collection, linked as 
IGMO, is important for the appropriate decision-making; 
hence, how the commander conducts these operations 
becomes important. This paper combines the above social 
media operations with the Endsley Model to provide 
guideline on how to conduct the operation. 
 
IV. PROPOSAL METHOD: ENDSLEY’S SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS MODEL 
 
This section describes a proposal method to explain the 
process of determining social media operations. In this 
paper, the three types of social media operations (IGMO, 
DeSMO, OSMO) is defined as the commander’s final goal. 
With this goal, the paper presents the guideline for the 
commander to make decision, based on the Endsley Model. 
Figure 3 shows a process used in this paper. The paper 
focuses on situational awareness section for proper decision-
making. Situational awareness is a three-stage process, with 
the following components: (1) Perception of data and the 
elements of the environment (2) Comprehension of the 
meaning and significance of the situation (3) Projection of 
future states and events [7]. Therefore, a commander acting 
in the environment should first gather observable 
information; selectively attend to the information that is 
most relevant to the task at hand; integrate incoming 
information with existing knowledge and make it 
understandable in light of the current situation; and finally, 
predict changes in the environment and subsequently the 




Figure 3: Endsley Model and Social Media Operation 
 
Table 2 
Strength and Weakness of IGMO 
 
Strength Score (%) 
The extent and usefulness of 
the collected information to 
the army (Level 2) 
Our army’s utility to lose with false 
information of the enemy (Level 2) 
A small information risk 
exposure of our military by 
conducting IGMO (Level 1) 
The possibility of social media 
platform blocking SMA (Level 3) 
 
V. SOCIAL MEDIA OPERATION 
 
This section describes how each level of the Endsley 
Situation Awareness Model will be applied to social media 
operations and the factors that the commander must consider 
when determining the SMO. 
 
A. Situational Awareness in Social Media Operation 
1) Perception (Level 1 SA)  
The first step to achieve SA is to recognize the data as 
well as the status and attributes of relevant elements in the 
social media environment. The data mentioned here are the 
data acquired through the IGMO. This paper assumes that 
IGMO is a task that is always performed and that it 
determines whether IGMO needs further execution in the 
decision-making stage. As mentioned previously, data 
obtained through IGMO are divided into direct content and 
metadata. 
The relevant elements of the social media environment are 
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classified as social media platform (SMP) and social media 
account (SMA). The status of SMP is expressed by the 
degree of activation. The degree of activation can be 
determined by the number of active users, the average 
number of connections between users, and the average 
logged -in time of users. For example, Facebook has 845 
million active users, the average Facebook user has 130 
friends and the average visit to Facebook lasts for 23 
minutes. The attributes of SMP are directly related to the 
purpose of average users using SMP. For example, Linkedin 
is often used for business purposes as compared to other 
SMPs. The attribute is determined by two factors, the first of 
which is the SMP policy that limits the format of the data. 
Facebook, for example, has no limitation on the format of 
data. Twitter, however can only deliver information in 140 
characters. With these limitations on the format of data, 
people use the platform differently, and the attributes of the 
platform also change. The second attribute of the SMP is the 
difference in information retention policy. The attributes of 
the platform depend on the degree of regulation of the user's 
information. 
If the SMP was a macroscopic concept, the SMA is a 
microscopic concept. As described above, the status of 
SMA is also expressed as the degree of activation. The 
degree of activation in SMA can be determined by the 
number of links (followers), number of posts, and number of 
Likes (Retweet) per day. The attributes of SMA is related to 
the purpose of the account using SMP. 
 
2) Comprehension (Level 2 SA) 
The next step in SA formation is synthesizing the 
separated Level 1 SA elements through pattern recognition, 
interpretation, and evaluation processes. This level 
incorporates the information that was segregated in Level 1 
to understand the impact on the military's goals and 
objectives. In other words, it analyzes collected social media 
information and finds meaningful information. 
For instance, based on the direct content, one can analyze 
the characteristics of the SMA's writing or analyze the 
psychological and sociological meaning of the content. In 
addition to quantitative pattern recognition algorithms, the 
ability of the commander to recognize the situation is also 
important when analyzing the data. 
 
3) Projection (Level 3 SA) 
The third level of SA includes the ability to project the 
future behavior of an element in the environment. 
Thus, in addition to the information analyzed through 
Level 2 SA Comprehension, further considerations include 
how the SMP and SMA will be used by the enemy and 
whether the benefits gained prior to Level 2 are sustainable 
elements in the future. 
 
B. Factors to Consider when a Commander Decides 
Social Media Operation 
Below is a list of criteria that can be used in the situational 
awareness phase to determine each SMO. 
 
1) IGMO 
As mentioned above, IGMO assumes to be a frequently 
performed task. The data collected through the IGMO 
applies to Endsley's situational awareness. At this time, 
according to SA Level 1 and 2 mentioned above, it is 
necessary to confirm whether it is perceivable information. 
The IGMO should be performed consistently because it is a 
component of the effective Cyber ISR in the social media 
operation. 
The factors that the commander should consider in order 
to determine the IGMO are listed in Table 2. For each 
factor, the magnitude can be determined qualitatively by the 
commander. IGMO should be implemented if their merits 
and risk totals are positive. 
Each element has a level of Endsley model. This allows us 
to compare the strengths and weaknesses of IGMO in light 
of Endsley's situational awareness. 
 
2) DeSMO & OSMO 
 
  
Figure 4: Status of Relevant Elements 
 
Based on the methodology of Factor Analysis of 
Information Risk (FAIR), the paper designed a criteria table 
to help the commander qualitatively judge which SMO to 
carry out. To determine whether enemy's OSMO is 
threatening or ally's DeSMO is effective, the commander 
should first consider the status of SMP and SMA. The 
commander can divide the status of SMP and SMA based on 
qualitative criteria as shown in Figure 4 and jointly consider 
them based on the status of relevant elements. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper introduces a set of guidelines and procedures 
for the types of social media operation to be used by a 
commander. By introducing the framework of the social 
media operation for the first time, the commander can learn 
a series of processes to reasonably manage the social media 
operation. Specifically, we defined information at each state 
which are related to the Endsley’s model so as to be 
specialized in social media operation and explained how the 
three levels of situational awareness are applied. This paper 
also takes into consideration that the social media has a 
disadvantage of giving unintended benefits to the enemy 
because of the bidirectional property. Therefore, if the 
commander is concerned about the current state and the 
projection of future status using the framework, the 
bidirectional property could be considered as it allows for 
the calculation of the utility and the damage of the enemy 
and the military. Using the Endsley model and the FAIR 
model, it can be applied not only to the Situational 
Awareness but also to the Battle Damage Assessment of the 
Social Media Operation. However, this paper does not 
fundamentally solve the doubts that the effects of SMO are 
marginal [6]. First, SMO's benefits are not universal. 
According to other studies, SMO only works on conflict 
areas that have a high degree of connectedness and social 
media activity. The positive view of this limitation is that 
the problem will be solved in the near future when the social 
media becomes universal as the spread of social media 
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becomes rapid due to the increased desire for IT worldwide. 
In addition, it should be performed in the real time 
considering the sophisticated and continuous monitoring is 
required due to the entangled social media network. Finally, 
continuous monitoring and countermeasures are needed in 
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